ANGLO – MANIPUR RELATION, 1833 - 1891

ANGLO – MANIPUR RELATION, 1833 - 1891

Lal Dena

British colonial authority normally employed two different systems of colonial rule for formal colonized states and protected states. It adopted the system of direct rule in the colonized states or countries. Under this system, the colonial power fully controlled the state or country and its government. Most important, the economy of such colony was structured to serve the needs of the imperial state. In other words, the needs of colonized states or countries were subordinated to the needs of the imperial state. In the case of protected states, the colonial authority employed the system of indirect rule. Under this system the relationship was between colonial agents and individual local rulers. No policy, however well formulated, should go into effect except through the medium of these particular British officials. This system stood as the conscious model for later imperial administrators and politicians who wished to extend the British influence without the economic and political costs of direct annexation. Under the system of indirect rule, no colonial official was allowed to undertake any major reforms or changes. If at all there were changes, these were carefully guided and directed changes. Despite British influence and control, whether potential or actual, the colonial officials never attempted to change the political system of the native states to any significant degree. Thus due to a deliberate policy on the part of British, the native states were allowed to retain a distinct political character which was very different from that of British Indian provinces. It was the primary concern of the colonial authority to preserve the native political system if it existed in full vigor, to revive it if it was in a state of decay, to reconstitute it if it had become disintegrated and to entrust it gradually with such minor functions as it was able to discharge. In Malaysia and Indian native states, this colonial system of indirect rule was applied at different times in history.

In India alone, there were approximately about 680 native states. Of these about 127 were minor states. In major native states, British residents were deputed and in minor states, political agents. It should be noted that no Indian held such key-posts. In fact, British policy depended on the ruling princes as the ‘natural leaders’ who would hold the people of their states in loyalty to the British crown.

Let us now see what type of officials was recruited for these key posts. In the beginning, members belonging to the civil service were appointed to these posts. But by the beginning of the 19^th century, more and more military officers were recruited for these posts. Against an average of 37 writers, an average of 258 cadets was sent to India annually. Thus, the supply of civil servants was for less than the supply of military officers. It is therefore not surprising that majors, colonels or lieutenants were deputed to hold such posts particularly in minor native states. This is exactly what happened in Manipur. The same system of control was also applied to the hill areas of Manipur. A point of fundamental significance which marked British policy towards the hill tribes was the recognition of tribal chiefs who, no doubt, enjoyed considerable powers and privileges within their respective chiefdoms. The main concern of the British was to collect hill house tax and exact forced labor through the tribal chiefs. Within the colonial set up, the chiefs assumed two important roles: first as interpreter of tribal customary laws and secondly as collector of hill-house tax within their chiefdom. In this way, the tribal chiefs became a very important link between the people and the colonial officials.

The British rulers wanted to maintain the existing friendly relationship with Manipur. So they decided to depute a political agent to Imphal, the capital of the state. This officer was to act as a medium of communication between Manipur and Burma. As occasion might require, he was also to prevent border feuds and disturbances which might lead to hostilities between the two neighboring countries. Lieutenant George Gordon whose ability, intelligence and local knowledge of the situation was already known to the high officials at Calcutta, was first appointed to this post in 1835 and continued till 1844. Gordon was instructed to correspond directly with the secretary to government of Bengal in the political department.

Gordon wanted to ensure political stability in the country at any cost and his policy was guided by political expediency and opportunism. Nara Singh was a regent king as Chandrakirti Singh, an infant son of Gambhir Singh was hardly two years old. Nara Singh was very friendly with Gordon. On Gordon’s proposal, the governor-general-in-council formally recognized Nara Singh king of Manipur in September, 1844. Gordon died in December 1844. William McCulloch succeeded him as the next political agent of Manipur. Like Gordon, McCulloch soon established a very cordial relationship with the king. But there was no peace in Manipur because other princes planned to attack Manipur from different sides.  Fully aware of these dangers, Nara Singh informed all the movements of the rebel parties to McCulloch who in fact stood behind Nara Singh in all critical times.

In the mean time, Nara Singh passed away on 11 April 1850, and his brother Devendra Singh succeeded him to the throne. On the recommendation of McCulloch again, the British government recognized Devendra Singh. The establishment of good order and political stability in the country was the prime concern of the British. Therefore, McCulloch strongly advocated the stationing of British troops in Manipur permanently as the most effectual means for maintaining peace and order. The presence of such troops, McCulloch hoped, was sufficient to deter any frequent contest for the throne, so injurious to the country and British interest.

In the mean time, Chandrakirti made an elaborate preparation to regain the throne of Manipur and moved towards Manipur.  Chandrakirti soon gained popularity and a large number of Manipuri soldiers began to join him. Unable to resist Chandrakirti’s forces, Devendra Singh fled from Manipur at night. On 13 July 1850 Chandrakirti became the king of Manipur. After two days, he made a courtesy call to the political agent informing him about the latest situation. Realizing the mass support and sympathy which Chandrakirti enjoyed, McCulloch asked the British Indian government to formally recognize Chandrakirti as king of Manipur. Endorsing McCulloch’s proposal, the government of British India in its letter on 3 October 1851, thus instructed McCulloch “to make a public avowal of the determination of the British government to uphold the present rajah, and resist and punish any parties attempting hereafter to dispossess him”. At the same time the court of directors of the East India Company in a dispatch on 5 May 1852 also confirmed the order of the government of India by stressing that the political agent was both protector and guide to the rajah; he was also under obligation to protect his subjects against oppression on his (rajah’s) part; “otherwise our guarantee of his rule may be cause of inflicting on them a continuance of reckless tyranny”.  In this way, the British slowly consolidated their position in Manipur. All correspondences with other countries including neighboring states of North East India were routed through the political agent. Most of the time, the maharajah also acted on the advice and decision of the political agent.

 Manipur always had turbulent relations with the neighboring tribes like Kukis, Kamhaus (Suktes), Mizos and Nagas. Perhaps most frequent raids during this period were committed by Vanhnuailala, Pawibawia, Vanpuilala and Suakpuilala, the first two were known as the eastern chiefs and the latter two as the western chiefs of Mizos. At the suggestion of General Lister, the Kuki levy was raised in 1850 partly as a force to be used against the Mizos and partly to give employment to the youths of Kuki whose love for fighting would then be legitimately gratified in defending the frontiers. Major Stewart commanded the levy which was amalgamated with the state police in 1869.

In March 1869, the maharajah deputed 110 Kukis into the Mizo hills. At this both the eastern and western chiefs of Mizos also sent three envoys to pave the way for reconciliation with Manipur by promising to restore all the prisoners and guns which they collected during their raid on Manipur in February, 1869. Dr R.Brown, the political agent, advised the maharajah not to make any promises whatever. Only on the delivery of captives and guns, Manipur was prepared to hear what the Mizo messengers had to say. The messengers were further informed that if they were genuinely desirous of making peace, their chiefs and headmen must come as it was with them that any negotiation was to be carried on. While the negotiation was going on, the Mizos committed another raid on one village near Moirang in December 1869.

Again in 1871, the Mizos committed raids in Cachar, Sylhet, Manipur and Tripura. This led to an expedition being sent against them in which the levies of Manipur were invited to join. The expedition was quite successful. The followers of Vanpuilal, Pawibawi and Vanhnuailal were reduced to submission. Previous to the withdrawal of Manipur troops from Mizo hills, several of the chiefs entered into an engagement with the Manipuri authorities also to keep peace with Manipur for the future. The policy to be followed by Manipur with regard to Mizos was the establishment of friendly relations with Mizos. The governor of Bengal also instructed that the political agent in Manipur had to see that no aggression on the part of Manipur could be permitted and that the maharajah was also to take effective steps to make his subject Kukis understand this, and to punish rigorously any disobedience of this instruction.

In order to further improve the relations between Manipur and Mizo hills, Dr Brown was of the view that a personal visit to the Mizo hills and an interview with the chiefs and inhabitants would be productive of much good. For this purpose he wanted to make use of one Mizo chief, Damvung who, with his followers had settled in the Manipur hills to the south of the valley. Though the government of Bengal approved of the proposal initially, it later on suggested that the political agent should only be allowed to enter that portion of the Mizo hills which bordered on Manipur if expressly invited by the chiefs to do so. The stand of the government was that the Mizo chiefs should rather be encouraged to come into Manipur to discuss any pending issues.

In 1877, again the subjects of Pawibawi, Lalbura and Lengkam committed repeated raids on the Kabuis living in the villages adjacent to the main road from Cachar to Manipur. For fear of retaliation, Pawibawi and Lengkam expressed their willingness to have negotiation. The maharajah even proposed to send a deputation to Tipaimukh for the purpose. But J.W.Edgar, deputy commissioner of Cachar, pointed out that Lalbura could not be ignored in such peace negotiation and if need be, a joint meeting of all the chiefs should be convened to consider the question of future relations between Mizo hills and Manipur.

Another source of anxiety for Manipur was the Sukte or Kamhau tribe which lived to the south east of Manipur. The chief of Sukte was Kamhau and  the tribe came to be known as Kamhau tribe. Manipur considered this tribe to be a much more formidable one than the Mizos. They were a constant source of trouble to them, and at times made the southern portion of Manipur uninhabitable. Right from Nara Singh’s time 1834-1850, the Suktes made several raids upon Manipur villages. In 1857, the maharajah himself led an expedition of 1500 strong but was not successful because of the shortage of provisions. In April 1859, William McCulloch reported two serious aggressions by the Suktes on Manipur subjects in Sugnu area, not far from the southern frontier.

The administrative report for 1868-69 stated that after the expedition of 1857, the Suktes became friendly and even traded freely with the people in Manipur valley. But this did not last long. The Manipur authorities reported about seven raids from Suktes between 1857 and 1871. The question was whether an expedition as proposed by the maharajah was to be sent against the Suktes again. The governor-in-council considered it impolitic to send any such expedition. It thus instructed the political agent to advise the maharajah to adopt the same policy towards the Suktes as he did towards the Mizos. In October 1878 the Suktes attacked two villages again within Manipur territory to the south of the valley. The maharajah proposed to send an expedition against the Suktes to punish them for these raids. In spite of the lukewarm attitude of British officials, the maharajah organized an expedition of 2400 strong which started on February 19 and returned on 14 April 1875. After this, fewer raids were committed on Manipur territory by the Suktes.

Since McCulloch’s time none has been more successful than James Johnstone who took charge in September 1877 and continued till March 1886 as political agent of Manipur. Johnstone was a very shrewd and enlightened administrator.  He soon built up a very cordial relationship with the maharajah and his durbar members. Johnstone and the maharajah Chandrakirti met frequently and discussed almost every issue and problem of the state. Practically the maharajah and the durbar members depended on the advice of Johnstone. In fact, during Johnstone’s tenure the political agency assumed greater importance than it had ever been before.

The first problem which drew the attention of Johnstone was the long standing boundary dispute between Manipur and the Naga hills. Johnstone took a map and drew a line including all those areas which Manipur was entitled to. This was agreed to by the maharajah and then confirmed by the government of India later on. In spite of this boundary settlement, the Angami Nagas continued to create problems on the border. In October 1877, the Angamis of Khonomah village attacked a Naga village within Manipur and another group of Angamis also tried to collect a tax from a Naga village near the border. On hearing these raids, Jonhstone rushed at once to Naga hills with Balaram Singh, a principal minister of the maharajah. They brought with them an army of hundred soldiers of 35 native infantry assisted by Manipur soldiers. In 1879 the Angami Nagas once again rose in rebellion against the British. With the support of the maharajah, Johnstone mobilized an army of 2000 strong which was commanded by Surchandra and Tikendrajit and without much difficulty they could suppress the Angami uprising.

Another important incident during Johnstone’s agency was the Kongal Thanah incident which took place on 14 December 1877. The Kongal Thanah was a Manipuri outpost situated on the banks of the river Namia forming the boundary between Manipur and Burma, and is due north of the Kabaw valley. It was garrisoned by one jamadar and twenty sepoys. This thanah was attacked by about 100 Shans of the Kabo valley. Eight Manipuris were killed and the guard-house was also burned. The primary cause of the incident was over the boundary dispute between the two neighboring countries. Johnstone proceeded at once to the Kongal Thanah to investigate the incident. It took him two years to complete the work. Johnstone sent a full report of the Kongal incident to the government of India, and a demand for reparation was made at the court of Mandalay. To solve the boundary dispute, a commission was set up. The commission laid down a new boundary line which was included in the terms of the treaty of 1834. The boundary thus fixed followed the base of the eastern slopes of Malain range, crossed the river Namia a few hundred yards south of Kangol Thanah, then turned east to the Talain river, followed that river upward to its source, and then proceeded down the Napanga river to where it passed through a gorge in the Kusom range. The point where the boundary intersected the Namia river and touched the Talain river was marked with pillars, and a road was cut connecting these two points. But in 1884, the Burmese threatened to destroy the Kongal Thanah and the stone pillars again. With the outbreak of the third Anglo-Burmese war in 1885, the boundary dispute was kept in abeyance for sometime.

Closely connected with this incident was the attack of the border area of Manipur by the Chasad Kukis in 1877.  The Chasad Kukis left their old home in southern Burma and then settled in the hills bordering on the Manipur valley near the Kongal route to Burma. Their most important chief was called Tonggo who along with his tributary off-shoots declared that they were no longer under the control of the king of Manipur and decided to leave Manipur altogether In February 1883 the political agent and Manipuri troops took possession of Tonggo’s village and finally suppressed the rebellion.

The part played by Manipur and the role of James Johnstone in the third Anglo-Burmese war of 1885 were remarkable. The war broke out in November 1885. A few days before the commencement of hostilities, Johnstone was informed that three European employees of the Bombay Burma corporation-Allen, Roberts and Moncure were murdered by the secretary of the queen of Burma; while seven others were handed over as prisoners to the woon (governor) of Kendat. Johnstone left Manipur on 19 December 1885 with force of 50 men of his own escort of the 4^th Bengal native infantry and 400 Manipuris and 500 Kukis to rescue the prisoners. By 5 January 1886, Johnstone and his men could evacuate the Burmese stockade on the opposite bank of the Chindwin river and took possession of the whole areas. In this connection, Robert Reids comments thus: “The services he (Johnstone) and the Manipur state forces had rendered in restoring order in the Kabaw and Chindwin valleys…were considerable, and really appreciated by the British authorities”.

James Johnstone was succeeded by Trotter as new political agent who died six months after his appointment. The situation required a very able political agent who could continue the process of needed reforms which Johnstone had started in keeping with the times. Unfortunately the foreign office of British India which had a long traditional knowledge of Manipur could not find a suitable and far sighted person of Johnstone’s status to fill the post. Later on, Grimwood, a junior officer of Sylhet, was appointed as the next political agent of Manipur. Grimwood’s inept handling of conflicts among the ruling princes followed by British imperial policy based on ’might is right’ finally led to the Anglo- Manipur war of 1891signalling the fall of independent Manipur after the famous battle at Khongjom on 23 April,1891.