Roots of
Separatism in North East India
Prof. Lal Dena
As
we are all aware, like any other
neighbouring states, Tripura also experienced both the fortune and vicissitudes
of her long history. When she succumbed to the onslaught of British imperialism
in the middle of the 19th century, the British collected revenue only
from the plains Tripura and leaving the hill Tipperah as independent. Alexander
Mackenzie, in this connection, has made a vivid observation: “Covered with jungles and inhabited by tribes
of whom nothing was known, save that they were uncouth in speech and not
particular as to clothing, the hills were looked upon as something apart. The
rajah claimed to exercise authority within them, but did not, as it seemed,
derive much profit from them. Accordingly the hills became ‘independent’
Tiperrah, and the rajah who is an ordinary Bengali zamindar on the plains,
reigns an independent prince over 3,000 square miles of upland, and was for
many years a more absolute monarch than Scindhia or Pattiala,-owning no law but
his sovereign will, bound by no treaty, subject to no control, safe in his
obscurity from criticism or reform[1].”
Not
contented with mere collection of revenue, the colonial authorities at Fort William
later thought in terms of strengthening their control over the state by
adopting the colonial system of indirect rule. Under this system, a single
British resident or political agent controlled a regional state through advice
given to the local prince. This system stood as the conscious model for later
imperial administrators and politicians who wished to extend colonial influence
without the economic and political cost of direct annexation[2].
One condition was that no colonial agent was allowed to undertake any major
reforms in such state. If at all there were changes, these were carefully
guided and directed changes. It was a deliberate policy of British imperialists
to preserve the native political system if it existed in full vigour, to revive
it if it was in state of decay, to reconstitute it if it had become
disintegrated and to entrust it gradually with such minor functions as it was
able to discharge[3]. In this
way, the princely states were allowed to retain a distinct political character
which was very different from directly administered territories of British India.
Under
the colonial system of indirect rule, the state did not experience direct
colonial exploitation as those regions under British India.
The only link between British India and the
native states was the British resident or agent. In other words, the
relationship was confined to the colonial agent and the individual local rulers
together with their native staff members[4].
Under conditions of isolation and also a fairly stable internal
self-sufficiency in food production, the ruling princes tended to isolate the
state economically. A more overriding consideration was the fear that if the
state became linked economically with the external world, the ruling princes
were likely to become subservient politically. The economic backwardness of the
state during the colonial period and even post-colonial period may be seen in
the context of the system of indirect rule from which it ultimately derived and
to which it was inexorably bound. To quote John Hurd in this connection,
“Indirect rule guaranteed the perpetuation of quasi-sovereign units which in
many cases had inadequate resource bases. Frozen by fiat, their political
systems could not be altered either by evolution or revolution. Although the
government of British India permitted the
states to exist, it kept them in a condition of dependence. While it protected
their boundaries and internal political structure, it did almost nothing to
help them in the external economic world[5].”
This
is the system through which the political agent exercised control over Tripura.
Even though the earlier period of Tripura’s history was rebellion-dominated
saga[6],
the combined feudalistic-colonial rule faced no major disturbance except the
Reang revolt of 1942-43 which was directed essentially against the ruling
monarch. With the dawn of India’s
freedom struggle which began to penetrate the plains of Tripura from the first
half of the 20th century, new socio-political movements soon
emerged. In the process, there emerged a number of socio-political organizations
which soon demanded for the immediate democratization of Tripura’s political
system and establishment of responsible government. Most vocal among the newly
formed political parties were the Tripura State Congress and the Communist
party in their campaign against the feudalistic monarchical rule. Yielding to
the public pressure, the regent queen, maharani Kanchan Parva Devi, on behalf
of the minor maharaja Kirit Bikram Kishore Manikya, announced the decision of
the state to be a part of Indian Union on 9 September, 1949 which was ratified
by the Tripura Sangha in an open session
attended by about 20,000 hill men of various classes and all
other political organizations[7].
The
post-merger period of Tripura brought party politics into full play which was
of course dominated by the Tripura State Congress and the Communist party.
Equally significant in all this development was the gradual polarization of
Tripuri ethnic consciousness which resulted in the formation of the Tripura Upajati Juba
Samiti (TUJS) in June 1967. Convinced of the fact that the Congress and the
Communist party did not play effective role for the protection of their
interests and self-determination, the Tripura Upajati Juba Samiti in one of its
slogans declared thus, “Kwchak kwfur chong sinia, bwini tala chong tongya;
kwchak kwfur chong hwngya, barni tala chwng tongya. (We do not know what is
Congress or Communist. We will not stay under any one. We do not any longer
want to be under the umbrella of Communist party or the Congress party)”[8].
The party ideology of TUJS, among others, centred around (a) popularization of
Kok-Borok (Tripuri language) as a symbol of group identity; (b) education in
Kok-Borok; (c) restoration of lands, and (d) demand for self-government. The
TUJS movement soon assumed violent character and in its Taidu conference of
1980 raised the slogan “independent Tripura” and also resolved to drive out the
“outsiders” who had come to Tripura after 15 October,1949[9].
Why is it that all the tribal movements in Tripura and for that matter in the
whole of North East had inevitably assumed secessionist and violent characters?
What are the historical roots of the schizophrenic alienation of North East
India? What has been done so far to solve these on-going movements and what else
can be done to meet the political aspirations of the people? Learned friends,
these are the few questions which I would like to pose before you to ponder
upon.
Pre-colonial
social formation: It is purely by an accident in history that North
East formed a part of India[10].
The social formation in mainland India and North East must first of
all be explained from historical perspective of three definable phases of
periods: pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods. Among societies in
mainland India,
social organization took the form of a caste structure and this continues to be
so even to the present day. In this way they had been linked up with one
another culturally and politically as a part of chain as it were even in
pre-colonial era[11].With
the exception of Meiteis in Imphal valley and the Assamese in Brahmaputra
valley, the hill people remained essentially outside the orbit of Hindu
influence and caste-based societal formation. While mainland Indian society
could evolve pan-Indian homogeneities and Hindu ethos in social formation all
through historical period, the hill people in North East, with their diverse
social alignments and group identities, produced a high degree of fluidity and
flexibility in their socio-cultural arenas[12].
But even among the Assamese who were perhaps the most Sanskritised community
with their Indo-Aryan language, the new intelligentsia began to see secession
of Assam
as the only means to save the Assamese nationality from prospective extinction[13].
In Manipur too, the process of Sanskritisation was deep-rooted and the belief
of their so-called Aryan connection also provided a strong base for belonging
to Hindu world of India
quite for some time. But in Manipur today, the belief that identification with
Hinduism would ensure their emotional integration with India is proved
false[14].
The new generation tends to denounce Vaishnavite Hinduism on the ground of
“cultural imperialism”[15].
Colonialism
and its impact: It may be noted that the British conquest of India and its
consolidation did not take place simultaneously throughout the entire country.
As a result, the objective condition causing political and national
consciousness among different communities and ethnic groups also did not mature
all at a time[16]. We
have already indicated that mainland India was unified culturally and
politically even before the coming of British in India. This unity was further
strengthened by colonization. This made the people of mainland India to see
the Indian history as their common past, their subordination to the colonial
rule as their common lot and its final overthrow as their common destination.
The colonial secluded policy towards North East also retarded the smooth
penetration of Indian nationalism among the marginal and peripheral
communities. In their dealings with the so-called frontier peoples in the North
East, the colonial authorities at Fort
William took up a policy
of segregating the hills and plains people. The inner line regulation passed in
1873 established a virtual boundary along the foothills and stressed that any
British subject or other person so prohibited, “who goes beyond the
inner-line…without a pass shall be liable, on conviction before the magistrate,
to a fine…”[17] Beyond
the inner-line, “the tribes are left to manage their own affairs with only such
interference on the part of the officers in their political capacity as may be
considered advisable with the view to establishing a personal influence for
good among the chiefs and tribes”[18].
Later
on, the inner line covered almost all the eastern hills and surprisingly enough
this system is still continuing in some hill states. Simultaneously, the
colonial officials also passed an act which envisaged the creation of scheduled
districts for the administration of certain areas that might be declared
‘backward tracts’[19]. Though
Assam
formed an integral part of British India, no
act would come into force in the backward tracts unless expressly extended to
them under the scheduled district act. Nor did the British Indian legislative
reforms cover these eastern regions. When the federal scheme under the
government of India
act of 1935 was introduced, the eastern regions with the exception of Assam were
placed either under ‘excluded areas’ or ‘partially excluded areas’. Excluded
areas covered exclusively tribal inhabited areas while partially excluded areas
had mixed populations, tribals and non-tribals. Both areas were excluded from
the competence of the provincial and federal legislature. The argument put
forward by the colonial academies was that these regions were so backward that
no sophisticated concept of representative institutions could be transplanted.
Only the concerned provincial governors in their own discretionary could
interfere in the day-to-day administration of these areas. In this way, the
people in the region felt the impact of colonial domination rather indirectly
and this is one of the fundamental factors which was responsible for the
slow emergence of political
consciousness among them. Even on the eve of the transfer of power in 1947, the
colonial officials thought in terms of creating and separating the eastern
tribal inhabited zones into a single political unit. Robert Reid, the then
governor of Assam,
strongly advocated the formation of a new colony, and his conclusion was in
favour of what would be, in essence, a separate country, “divorced from (as in Burma) the
control of the government of India.
This would not merely include all the hills of north, south and central Assam, but the
adjacent hills of Burma
and Bengal, and perhaps, the Shan states[20].”
Dr. Hutton and Mills also suggested
the unification of the eastern hill areas with Burma contending that ‘the people
are ethnologically more akin to the Burmese people than to the Indian people,
and they came to Assam
via Burma’[21].
Another proposal was the constitution of the eastern hill areas as a federal
agency directly under the federal government of India. In support of this proposal,
it was argued that all the hills, being financially deficit area, must depend
upon the financial support from the central government. Opponents of this
proposal expressed their fear that if the hill people were put under central
control, “they would be governed by ministers and politicians at Delhi and would have no
prospect of being themselves among the ministers and politicians who counted.
They might have one representative in one central assembly, but what is one
among so many diverse tribes? And they would have no hope of getting the ear of
the ministers. These ministers would be drawn from men of other races and
communities and provinces and, in so far as they have prepared to listen to men
from plains of their own castes and creeds, who would then have power without
responsibilities”[22]. The
present happenings in Northeast India today tend
to substantiate the two shades of arguments.
As a matter of fact, all the eastern states today entirely depend on doles
from metropolitan states and in the parliament they have hardly twelve
representatives who are too insignificant among the five hundred members. Lack
of ownership and sense of participation in the highest decision-making body
cannot but alienate the people. Arguing on the same line, Reginald Coupland, a
constitutional expert from Nuffield College, Oxford, also suggested that
creation of a crown colony of eastern agency consisting of the hill districts
and areas of Assam and Burma on the plea that these hill tribes “are not Indian nor Burmese, but of Mongoloid
stock. In no sense do they belong to the Indian or Burmese nation”[23].
Racial
factor in the politicization of ethnicity is equally important. As a matter of
fact, Northeast India is an extension of Southeast Asia in terms of ethnicity and culture. For
instance, the Meiteis of Manipur valley and the Ahoms of Brahmaputra valley
have close cultural and ethnic linkages with the Shans of upper Myanmar and the
Thais of Thailand. The Nagas of Manipur and Nagaland have their kith and kin
across the border in Myanmar,
the Chin hills in Myanmar but also trace their origin
from central China.
The Singphos of Arunachal Pradesh have in the Kachin of the Kachin state of
upper Myanmar
their relations. The Khasis and Jaintias of Meghalaya have similarities in
language and culture with the Mon-Khmers of Cambodia, Thailand and
eastern Myanmar.
D.R. Sardesai even goes to the extend of saying that the Khmers in Cambodia
migrated along with their cousins, the Mons either from Southwest China or from
the Khasis hills in Northeast India[24].
Linguistically too, all the ethnic
groups in Northeast speak languages belonging to the Tibeto-Chinese
family which may further be divided into Tibeto-Burman and Siamese-Chinese
sub-families. Well aware of the complexities of inter-ethnic connections
between Southeast Asia and North East India,
the colonial rulers deliberately demarcated artificial boundaries dividing even
same ethnic groups of the two neighbouring countries to suit their imperial
interests.
As a matter of fact, at the
super-structure level, the colonial rule served as a sort of link between
mainland India
and North East India; but at the bottom level, it acted as a wall of barrier
which prevented cross socio-cultural and political interactions between the
regions during the whole historical period. As a result, there was no common
national ideology which could bridge the gap between the two regions. Even when
the nationalist freedom struggle reached its climax under the leadership of
Mahatma Gandhiji, the waves of Indian nationalism never crossed beyond the Brahmaputra valley. Summing up the whole situation, H.K.
Sareen has rightly observed thus, “Those in the leadership of the national
movement paid scant attention to the masses of the people in the hills and
valleys of North East India. That is why they did not or could not devise any
ethos of breaking the barrier created by the imperialist rulers and drawing the
masses into the struggle for independence. This remained one of the weaknesses
of our national movement”[25].
Where need for common national ideology was obvious and where no core
nationalism was readily available, the search for identity led to more familiar
identities like ethnicity and language. Therefore, ethnic self-consciousness
and its assertion along the lines of ethnicity or language was increasingly manifested in the eastern
region as a whole[26].
Another
factor, perhaps more crucial, was the uneven development of the colonial
economy which greatly retarded the uniform growth and maturity of Indian
nationalism among the different ethnic groups of the country. Due to this
unequal economic development, national consciousness also developed unevenly.
This is so because the entry of British capitalism in colonial form took place
at different times in different regions with varying intensity producing
dissimilar effects. In fact, at the time of its penetration into various regions
of the sub-continent, it was at different stages of advancement. Since the port
cities of Calcutta,
Bombay and Madras presidencies were
the fore-most British business centres; and the centre of capital investment
and infrastructural development took place faster in these areas. The emergence
of Bengalees, Marathis and Tamils as major nationalities, for example, was not
accidental.[27]. Thus,
colonial India
experienced two streams of coeval processes as far as its nationality formation
was concerned. The first was based on its pan-Indian identity and the second
one on its regional ethnic identity. What had actually emerged in course of
time were two types of nationalities: consolidated nationalities and marginal
nationalities. The consolidated nationalities may be said to include Bengali,
Bihari, Gujarati, Kanadiga, Konkani, Malayalee, Marathi, Oriya, Punjabi,
Telegu, Tamil, etc. They are called so because they were well interconnected in
some way or the other in the historical past. They evolved common social structure,
common religion and common culture. In short, they shared common historical
experiences both in pre-colonial and during colonial period. Therefore, the
transformation of these consolidated nationalities into the core nationalism (Indian
nationalism) was automatic and spontaneous[28].
On the other hand, there are marginal nationalities which include Bodo, Borok (Tripuri),
Dimasa, Garo, Gurkha, Khasi, Meitei (Manipuri), Mizo, Naga, etc. They are
called so because their integration with the Indian state structure had taken
place only at the end of colonial rule[29].
Even
Assam
which formed a part of British India was not
linked with the Indian mainstream of trade, commerce and industry. There were
no local capitalists who could compete British or mainland Indian capitalists.
Modern industry, trade and commerce formed the objective foundation of Indian
capitalism but these were conspicuous in their absence in Assam.
Tilottama Misra has said: “In Assam, development of modern industries,
transport, banking and other aspects of capitalist growth did not take place
during British rule; and even after 1947, little has been done to build up even
the infrastructure for the development of modern trade and industry in Assam
using this backward state as colonial hinterland”[30].
The only major industries such as the oil mining and tea plantation which were
started by British capitalists continued to be monopolized by non-indigenous
capitalists till today. This is to say that viable, vibrant and independent
indigenous capitalism which could perhaps contribute to a more developed
economy, failed to develop in the region[31].
True, the new intelligentsia, no doubt, did participate in the freedom struggle
and the Brahmaputra valley also witnessed the
mass upsurge of the non-co-operation movement. But at the same time, the
Assamese intelligentsia continued to think in terms of Assam and her
nationality problem rather than on the all-India plane. Tilottama Misra has
further argued that the allegiance of the Assamese intelligentsia to the Indian
National Congress was also marked by strong regional considerations. As early
as 1937, the Asamya Sanrakshini Sabha
presented a memorandum to Jawaharlal Nehru by stressing that unless the
National Congress helped Assam to overcome the danger of the ‘extinction of the
Assamese race, a section of the Assamese intelligentsia would favour the
secession of Assam from India’[32].
Thus, throughout the colonial period and after, Assam had been under the constant
threats of absorption from more advanced nationality and unresolved foreign national
issue.
From
what has been indicated above, it is quite clear that Assam and the
whole of the eastern hill region had not been closely integrated with the
all-India capitalist development. The resultant situation was the creation of
internal colonialism, real or imaginary. Where people were made to develop more
sophisticated needs only through consumption stimuli and where no
infra-structural development was encouraged, the people were bound to be
perpetually dependent on the more advanced states and then finally became a
parasite economically. More damaging is the long-term psychological impact on
the people: people from the peripheries tending to develop colonized mentality
and people from the metropolis colonial mentality[33].
The
roots of ethnic separatism or secessionism must also be sought in the context
of the relations and positions of different ethnic groups within the state. Donald
L.Horowitz in his ‘Pattern of Ethnic Separatism’ has put forth the following
categories of potential separation: (a) backward ethnic groups in backward
region; (b) advanced ethnic groups in backward region; (c) advanced ethnic
groups in advanced region; and (d) backward ethnic groups in advanced region[34].
Horowitz’s finding was that the groups in the first category were the most
frequent and precocious separatists and their ethnic anxiety also the largest.
This is precisely what has been happening in North East India for the last
several decades. The ethnic groups that occupy backward peripheral regions not
only fail to identify with the core nationalism but also tend to develop their
own ethnic-based nationalism. If an ethnic group succeeds by its own efforts in
achieving and maintaining group rights through political action and political
mobilization, it goes beyond ethnicity, according to Paul Brass, to establish
itself as a nationality[35].
In other words, when an ethnic group achieves a certain degree of autonomy
within an existing political structure or in a state of its own, it becomes a
nationality or a nation[36].
The case of Naga appears to support this view-point. In this connection, Udayon
Mishra has commented thus; “The Naga’s
loyalty to his tribe or clan is being gradually replaced by his loyalty to the concept of united
Nagaland which will include all the Naga inhabited territory between the Chindwin in Burma and the Brahmaputra
in Assam.
This demand for a greater Nagaland is clearly linked with the growing tide of
Naga nationalism which has succeeded in greatly reducing, if not altogether
doing away with, inter-tribe and inter-clan rivalries and differences. This
development from tribe and clan organization to the idea of a sovereign Naga
state comprising the entire Naga nation, has been helped immensely by the
Naga’s intensely deep attachment to his native soil and to common local
tradition”[37].
Existing autonomy arrangement: To meet
the political aspirations of the North East people, the government of India has so
far adopted two models of autonomy- one in the form of sixth scheduled district
and another the autonomy enjoined with a state as provided under the
constitution of India.
The scheduled district arrangement was a colonial concept which was mooted as
far back as in 1874[38].
Consequent upon India’s
independence in 1947, the constituent assembly accepted the Bordoloi
committee’s recommendation on the need for creation of sixth scheduled
districts for the protection of land rights, language and culture through a
certain degree of autonomy for the tribal people in undivided Assam. Now,
with the exception of Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and Nagaland, the sixth
scheduled model has currently been applied to Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram and
Tripura.
To
some, the sixth scheduled model has been a progressive constitutional
arrangement. But on closer scrutiny, the model has several inherent drawbacks.
All laws and regulations made by the district councils require the consent of
the state governor which, in other words, means the state. The main funding
institution for the districts is again the state. More often than not, the
state government always restrains the exercise of autonomy by the district
councils. Article 31(A) of the constitution gives the government the power to
acquire any land, occupied or not. Moreover, all forest lands are exempt from
the jurisdiction of the councils.
The
passing of the 73rd constitution amendment of 1992 has further made
the sixth scheduled councils almost redundant. The panchayat bodies are
entitled to get funds from the state and the central government under several
schemes, in addition to their own regular sources of income by taxation,
mobilization of locally available resources and the like. The establishment of
the finance commission is meant to prevent the panchayats from falling into
financial starvation. Whereas the scheduled district councils are solely at the
mercy of their state government. They often complain that they have not
received what the state owes them, and with the subsidy withheld, they are
often paralyzed. In many cases, resource allocation has been a major bone of
contention between the district councils and the state governments. As a
result, the autonomous function of the councils has been greatly restricted by
their financial and administrative dependence on the state governments. Another
advantage which the panchayat bodies have over the district councils relates to
the duration of their dissolution. The dissolved panchayats must be
reconstituted within a period of six months from the date of their dissolution.
For the district councils, fresh election can be held subject to the approval
of the state legislature within a period not exceeding twelve months.
True,
the scheduled district councils have some legislative and judicial powers on
delegated subjects. But even here, the panchayats have far exceeded the
councils. The 73rd constitution amendment has delegated the twenty
nine subjects under the 11th schedule of the constitution to the
already long list of subjects of the panchayats.. Just to cite one example, while
Zilla Parishads have control over higher secondary schools, the district
councils have controlling power over primary schools only. What is so
conspicuously absent in the district councils is the provision for empowerment
of women. Under the panchayat bodies, not only seats are reserved for election
of a certain fixed number of women, but specific quota of pradhans and
up-pradhans in gram pranchayats and adhyakshas and up-adhyakshas in Zilla
Parishads are reserved for elected women. On the whole, while the proverbial
Democle’s sword of state control hangs over the district councils, a
liberalization process has been set in motion in respect of the panchayats[39].
Regarding
the autonomy enjoined with the states, much can be said. Quasi-federal in form,
the Indian constitution can best be described as reluctant federalism. The
union government retains extensive legal, administrative, legislative and
financial powers and in certain situations of so-called political instability,
it can dismiss an elected state government. Baruah has rightly pointed out that
in the area of control over fiscal
resources, Indian federalism is probably at its weakest. If the concern for
Indian unity made India’s constitution
makers reluctant federalists, their enthusiasm for national development turned
them into central planners keen on grabbing as much control over resources and powers of economic
management as possible[40].
Since there is no genuine devolution of power to the states and to the
scheduled district councils in the true spirit of federalism, the entire
contemporary history of modern India
is filled with series of demands for more autonomy and in the case of North
East, for secession. This makes the process of strengthening the Indian
nation-state quite vulnerable and this process, if not handled properly, can be
a process of nation-in-the unmaking as well[41].
Is the right to self-determination an
alternative?
In
view of the on-going secessionist movements in North East India and the
indigenous people’s movements, the issue of the right of self-determination is
of pressing importance now. In a democratic set up, self-determination is a
basic right which gives a group independent statehood or expanded power within
a federal state[42]. Some
scholars have classified self-determination into various types. According to
Ronen, self-determination is classified into five types, such as (a) national
self-determination as the aspiration to rule one’s self, and not to be ruled or
controlled by others; (b) class self-determination meaning the proletariat’s
quest for self-determination to establish the true communist society free from
bourgeois exploitation; (c) minorities’ self-determination meaning minority
should not be forced under any sovereignty under which it does not wish to live
but be given a fair chance to decide whether it desires to live in an existing
sovereign state or to set up new independent state; (d) racial
self-determination meaning the aspiration of people for self-rule on the basis
of race; and, (e) ethnic self-determination meaning that ethnic groups should
freely determine the form of government which ranges from limited autonomy to
independence[43]. Renon
himself admits of the inaccuracy of this classification and the minority and ethnic
self-determination could better be grouped as one under which racial
self-determination may also come. Some other scholars are more inclined to
broadly classify the right of self-determination into two: external
self-determination and internal self-determination[44].
External
self-determination: In so far as its external aspect is concerned, it
means creation of an independent state or integration of self-determining
people with an independent state. In other words, the external
self-determination also means separation of self-determining people from an
existing state or country of which they are a part to set up a new independent
state. According to R.N.Ismagilova, by external self-determination “is meant
the fight against relics of colonialism and neo-colonialism and the achievement
of state sovereignty; the solution of national and territorial problems of an
international character, in other words, the struggle for a just settlement of
relations with neighbouring states and peoples”[45]. The external self-determination thus inbreeds
secession. The right of a nationality or nation to determine its own destiny
presupposes freedom to secede, and without such freedom, unification or
integration is never real. As to the specific condition when secession is to be
resorted to, opinions may differ. But if a particular state and its successive
governments have repeatedly oppressed a people, minority or otherwise, over a
long period, violated their human rights and fundamental freedom, if other
means of achieving a sufficient degree of self-government have been tried and
have failed, then the question of secession can arise as a means for the
restoration of fundamental rights and freedom and the promotion of the
well-being of the people’[46].
A group of social scientists who met at Shimla in October,1993 on the
initiative of Prof.B.K.Roy Burman also has observed that in the context of the
emerging world moral order, if a state indulges in acts like genocide or
liquidation of peoples, the right of secession cannot be denied to the affected
peoples even though the UN system may not support it[47].
In this way, secession is seen by many as the ultimate manifestation of the
external right of self-determination. It should however be noted that secession
is not an absolute right and it cannot be invoked unilaterally.
Internal self-determination: The
internal self-determination primarily relates to self-government with a certain
degree of autonomy within the boundaries of an existing nation-state. It means
the right of people to determine their own social, economic and political
system, to depose their resources and to create conditions for their own
development within an existing state. In other words, the internal
self-determination refers to the autonomy and self-government actually enjoyed
or to be enjoyed by the autonomous entity in its political decision-making
process. It is understood to refer to independence of action on the internal or
domestic level, while foreign affairs and defense are in the hands of the
central or national government. The Sami homeland in Finland, the Greenland
home rule in Denmark,
the Nunuvut self-government in Canada
and the Kuna autonomy arrangement in Panama are good examples of the
implementation of the internal self-determination.
Of
these, the cases of Sami and the Greenland
stand unique. The Sami people are found in Norway (50,000), Sweden
(20,000), Finland
(8000) and Russia
(2000). Except in Russia,
the Samis have their own parliaments in all the three European countries. These
parliaments are all recognized as the sole representative Sami body with an autonomous power over (a) community
planning; (b) the management, use, leasing and assignment of state land,
conservation areas and wilderness areas; (c) applications for mining licenses;
(d) legislative or administrative changes pertaining to traditional Sami
occupations and livelihoods; (e) the development and teaching of Sami language
in schools, and in the social and health services; and, (e) any other matter
affecting the Sami language and culture[48].
On closer examination, it is found that the Sami parliaments in Norway and Finland are
genuinely autonomous and representative political bodies, while the Swedish
Sami parliament is more a part of the state authority. No European nation to
which Samis form a part, cannot take any final decision on any issue without
the approval of the Sami parliaments. Another notable fact is that the Sami
parliaments can represent the Sami people both at the national and
international level. Though Sami people are not independent, their autonomous status
has also some elements of external self-determination.
More
progressive in the implementation of internal self-determination is the Greenland home rule which was established since 1979. Greenland was colonized by Denmark in 1721. With the abolition
of her colonial status in 1953, Greenland
formed an integral part of Denmark.
By the home rule act of 1979, Greenland
government has the full authority in all matters of internal concern which
includes education, taxation, religion, social affairs, economy, infrastructure,
fishing, trade, cultural and political matters[49].
Of course, foreign affairs, currency, defense and judicial matters still remain
with the Danish government. Greenland
representatives can also be included in the Danish foreign delegation. These
are the two examples where the internal self-determination are implemented.
After all, the goal of internal self-determination is not the break- up of
existing state, not the estrangement of peoples, but their rapprochement, the
establishment of relations of friendship and cooperation between them. In this
way, internal right of
self-determination can be implemented through various mechanisms and
arrangements within the framework of a nation state and ultimately be a
powerful tool for genuine democracy and federalism.
To
sum up, I have tried to identify here the historical roots of alienation
of North East India, the emerging marginal nationalities and their
political aspirations within the framework of the right of self-determination.
The demands for greater autonomy and independence do not come from blue. They
are the outcome of certain internal contradictions in colonial and post-independent Indian state structure.
It must therefore be admitted that the attainment of national independence is
not a solution to the problem of nationalities. No nation which has attained
independence can consolidate it without the ethos of freedom permeating every share of
its life.
Thank you all.
(Reprint), 2001, p.
272.
Clarity
in the Pros. of the Second Session of Manipur Historical
Society,
Imphal. vol. I, 1996, pp.42-23.
[4]Hurd,
John; The
influence of British Policy on Industrial Development in the Princely States of
India 1890-1933, in the Indian Economy and Social History Review, vol. XII,
Oct-Dec.1975,No.4, p.423.
October-December,
1975, No. 4. P.423.
[5] Ibid; p.423.
Ph.D thesis,
Department of History, Tripura Uniuversity, Agartala
2001,op.cit.
p.59.
[7] Ibid; p.341.
[8] Ibid; p.349.
[9] Chakravarti,
Mahadev; Tribal Problem
of Tripura: Some Historical Interpretation, Studies in
the History of North East
India, Edited by J.B. Bhattacharya, NEHU
Publications,
Shillong, 1986, p.240.
[10]
Gupta, Anindita Das; Aliens
in their own land, in the North East Telegraph, 1st December, 1997, p.1
[11] Roy
Burman, B.K; Sketal
outline of Issues to be examined with reference to different
aspects of Tribal
Development-intentions, realities, challenges and tasks ahead, p.7.
[12]
Bhagabati, A.C; Presidential
Address of North East India History
Association, 18th
Session, Agartala, Tripuras, 1997, p.3.
[13] Nag,
Sajal; Nationalism,
Separatism and Secessionism, Rawat Publications, Jaipur
and
NewDelhi, 1999, p.24
[14]
Gangmumei; Philosophy
of History and Historiography of Manipur, M.U.Research
Club,
Imphal,1997,p.132.
[15] Lal
Dena; Manipur’s
Identity Crisis in India Abroad, New
York, 1980. p.2
[16] Andra
Pradesh.
Radical
Students’ Union; National
Question in India,
Hydrabad, 1982, p.29
[17] Chaube,
S.K; Hill
Politics in North East India, Orient Longman, Calcutta, 1973, p.15.
[18] Ibid; p.13
[19] Ibid; p.13
[20] Claw,
Andrew; The Future
Government of the Assam
Tribal Peoples, Shillong, 1945,
p.29.
[21] Ibid; p.30
[22] Ibid; p.31
[23] Ibid; p.33
[24] Sardesai,
D.R; Southeast Asia: Past and Present, Harpen Publishers, India, 1997,
p.11.
[25] Sareen,
H.K; Insurgency
in North East India: A Study of the
Sino-American Role,
Sterling
Publications, New Delhi,
1980, p.3.
[26]
Lal Dena; Nationality
Problem in North East India, The North East Voice, Guwahati, vol.1,No. 3,
August, 1994. p.18
[27] Nag,
Sajal; op.
cit. p.
[28] Lal
Dena; Nationality
Problem in North East India, pp. 17-18.
[30] Misra,
Tilottama; Assam and
National Question in India,
op. cit. p.55.
[31] Gupta,
Anindita Das; op.
cit. p.1.
[32] Misra
Tilottama; op
cit. p.57
[33] Lal
Dena; Nationality
Problem in North East India, p.17
[34]
Horiwits, Donald L; Pattern
of Ethnic Separatism, in Comparative Studies in Society and History. Vol-23,
Nos. 1-4, 1981, p.171, 173-174.
[35] Brass,
Paul; Ethnicity
and Nationalism, Sage Publications, New
Delhi, 1991, p.23.
[37] Mishra,
Udayon; Naga
National Question, in National Question in India, p.62.
[38] Chaube;
op.
cit, p.14-15.
[39] Roy
Burman; op.
cit, p.10-13.
[40]
Erni, Christian; Indigenous
Peoples Self Determination in North East India,
in Indigenous Affairs, IWGIA. 2002, p.64.
[41] Nag,
Sajal; op.
cit, p.20.
[42]
Philpot,Daniel; Self-Determination
in Practice in National Self-Determination and Secession edited by Margaret
Moore, Oxford University Press, 1998,p.81
Perspective,
Mittal Publications, New Delhi,
2000, pp.43-44
[44] Ibid; p.42
[45]
Ismagilova, R.N; Ethnic
Problems of Tropical Africa: Can they be solved? Progress
Publishers, Moscow, 1978, p.194.
[46]
Henriksen, John B; Implementation
of the Right of Self-Determination of Indigenous
Peoples,
in Indigenous Affairs, IWGIA Copenhagen,
2000, pp. 9-10.
[47] Roy
Burman, B.K; The
Indigenous Peoples and the Problem of Human Rights, in the
Administrator,
vol.XXXIX, April-June, 1994, p.21.
[48]
Henriksen; op.
cit. pp.18-19.
[49] Ibid; p.19.
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